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TOURO LAW REVIEW
right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Thus, the court held that
to retry the defendant on the second count was violative of her
right not to be placed in double jeopardy. 78
The United States Constitution has a Double Jeopardy Clause
which safeguards a defendant's rights as well. This right has
"from the very beginning been part of our constitutional
tradition" 79 and is "clearly 'fundamental to the American scheme
of justice.'"80 Hence, the Fifth Amendment protects a criminal
defendant from multiple punishments and repeated prosecutions
for the same offense. Accordingly, the LaDolce court dismissed




People v. Hempstead Video, Inc. 82
(printed December 29, 1994)
Hempstead Video, Inc., retailer of "adult novelties," moved to
dismiss summonses and information filed against it pursuant to a
Village of Valley Stream permit requirement on the grounds that
the ordinance's enactment and enforcement constituted double
jeopardy, 83 selective prosecution, 84 and impermissible regulation
78. Id.
79. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1968).
80. Id. (citation omitted).
81. LaDolce, 162 Misc. 2d at 351, 616 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
82. N.Y. L.J., Dec. 29, 1994, at 27 (Justice Ct. 2d Jud. Dep't 1994).
83. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." Id.; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Section six of the New
York Constitution provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be subject to be
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense .... " Id.
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of freedom of expression 85 in violation of both the New York
State and Federal Constitutions. 86 The Village of Valley Stream
Justice Court held that double jeopardy was not violated where
the legislative intent underlying the challenged ordinance made it
clear that each day a business opens its door it commits a separate
prosecutable offense; therefore, prosecutions subsequent to a
conviction for operating without a permit did not constitute
punishment twice for the "same offense."87 The court also ruled
that constitutionally impermissible selective prosecution was not
shown where Hempstead Video did not meet its heavy burden of
establishing unequal enforcement with an impermissible
purpose.8 8 Finally, the court held that the regulation of freedom
of expression was a reasonable, content-neutral, time, place, and
manner restriction. 89
The defendant, Hempstead Video, Inc., operated an "adult
shop," retailing various "novelties and devices." 90 At the time
the store opened, between July 16, 1994 and July 19, 1994, it did
not possess a certificate of registration as required under a
Village of Valley Stream ordinance. 91 On July 18, 1994, the
Board of Trustees for the Village enacted a sixty-day moratorium
prohibiting issuance of permits to "adult" businesses in order to
investigate and conduct hearings as needed to establish a local
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Federal Equal Protection Clause
provides in pertinent part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." Id.; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. Section eleven provides in pertinent
part: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state
or any subdivision thereof." Id.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech.... " Id.; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. Section eight provides in pertinent
part: "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech .... " Id.
86. Hempstead Video, Inc., N.Y. L., Dec. 29, 1994, at 27.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 28.
89. Id.
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law restricting "adult" businesses to certain areas. 92 On July 19,
1994, Hempstead Video was issued summonses for operating a
business without a permit. 93 On July 27, 1994, Hempstead Video
was convicted for operating without the required permit, the
charges involving the first day of the offense, July 19, 1994. 94
Consequently, it was fined $100 and given a conditional
discharge on the condition that it would "cease and desist"
operation until certification. 95 However, Hempstead Video
continued operation and received summonses from July 19, 1994
until the day it filed the motion discussed herein.96
Hempstead Video raised three constitutional claims in its
motion to dismiss. 97 First, Hempstead Video claimed that
issuance of summonses, in addition to the July 19, 1994
summons, constituted double jeopardy or punishment twice for
the same crime. 98 Second, Hempstead Video argued that it was
the victim of unconstitutional discrimination in the form of
"selective prosecution," claiming the permit law was enacted and
enforced for the sole purpose of preventing Hempstead Video and
"adult" businesses from operating. 99 Third, Hempstead Video
contended that the law, on its face, violated its freedom of
expression by giving impermissible discretion to officials to deny






97. Id. Hempstead Video also moved to dismiss the accusatory instrument
on the ground that it was defective. Id. It alleged that the People had only filed
summonses or appearance tickets that could not be considered accusatory
instruments. Id. The court noted, however, that the prosecutor had filed an
information and a superseding information. Id. Examining the superseding
information, the court found it to be sufficient. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. Hempstead Video claimed, in the alternative, that the law was
being unconstitutionkIly enforced to deny permits based solely on the content
of what the applicant intends to sell. Id.
786 [Vol 11
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The court first considered Hempstead Video's constitutional
claim that it had been subjected to double jeopardy under the
New York and Federal Constitutions. Hempstead Video argued
that issuance of additional summonses on an almost daily basis,
after its July 19, 1994 violation, constituted punishment twice for
the same crime. 101 More specifically, the claim was that
violation of the ordinance constitutes a "continuing offense" for
which only one prosecution is permissible.102
Considering this claim, the court reasoned that in order to
uphold convictions subsequent to the July 19, 1994 conviction,
"either the elements of the charges must be found to be
substantially different or the acts constituting the alleged
violations must be distinguishable from each other, particularly in
terms of time." 103 Whether two offenses are the same "is based
upon whether either offense requires proof of a fact which the
other does not." 104 This test requires that the court "examine the
evidence and determine whether the evidence required to support
101. Hempstead Video, Inc., N.Y. L.J., Dec. 29, 1994, at 27.
102. Id. The People responded that each day the business stayed open
without a permit constitutes a separate offense under the ordinance. Id.
103. Id. See N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 40.20(2)(a) (McKinney 1992). This
section provides in pertinent part: "A person may not be separately prosecuted
for two offenses based upon the same... criminal transaction unless: (a) The
offenses as defined have substantially different elements and the acts
establishing one offense are... clearly distinguishable from those establishing
the other." Id.; see also Auer v. Smith 77 A.D.2d 172, 432 N.Y.S.2d 926
(4th Dep't 1980). The Auer court noted a "criminal transaction" is conduct
involving at least one offense and at least two or more acts either "'so closely
related... in point of time and circumstance of commission as to constitute a
single criminal incident, or... so closely related in criminal purpose or
objective as to constitute elements or integral parts of a single criminal
venture.'" Id. at 182, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 933 (citation omitted).
104. Hempstead Video, Inc., N.Y. L.J., Dec. 29, 1994, at 27. See
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). In Blockburger, the
United States Supreme Court held that two sales of morphine not from the
original package, the second having been initiated after the first was complete,
were separate and distinct offenses under a narcotics statute. Id. at 301. The
Court noted that although the buyer and seller remained the same, time elapsed
between the first and second transactions. Id. The legislative intent underlying
the statute was explored by the Court so that it could determine whether "each
provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Id. at 304.
19951 787
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a conviction for one of the offenses also would suffice to support
a conviction for the other." 105
Citing People v. OkaforelO6 and People v. Brown,107 the court
in Hempstead Video, Inc. acknowledged that "the 'continuous
offense' doctrine most clearly arises in cases such as this one,
where a defendant is charged with repeated violations of a single
statute or ordinance." 10 8 Various factors adduced from Brown
were deemed relevant in making the determination of whether a
crime is "continuous:"
[W]hether there is unity of victim; whether the acts were
motivated by a single intent or scheme; whether the acts were
105. Hempstead Video, Inc., N.Y. L.J., Dec. 29, 1994, at 27. See United
States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993). "The same-elements test, sometimes
referred to as the 'Blockburger' test, inquires whether each offense contains an
element not contained in the other; if not, they are the 'same offense' and
double jeopardy bars additional punishment .... "Id. at 2856.
106. 72 N.Y.2d 81, 527 N.E.2d 245, 531 N.Y.S.2d 762 (1988). In
Okafore, the defendant was separately charged and convicted of criminal
possession of a weapon in the second degree as a result of incidents occurring
approximately one hour apart. Id. at 83, 527 N.E.2d at 246, 531 N.Y.S.2d at
763. One incident occurred in the Bronx, the other in New York County. Id.
Finding that second degree possession of a weapon requires the specific intent
to use the weapon unlawfully against another, the court reasoned that the
defendant's intent abated in the Bronx and subsequently formed again in New
York County. Id. at 87-88, 527 N.E.2d at 248, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 765.
Therefore, the court concluded that while defendant's possession of the
weapon was continuous, the intent was separate and distinct and two
prosecutable offenses were committed. Id.
107. 159 Misc. 2d 11, 603 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1993). In
Brown, the defendant moved to dismiss a usury indictment on the grounds that
it was duplicitous, as the People had only alleged a single loan, to a single
individual, with a single purpose, constituting a single scheme. Id. at 15, 603
N.Y.S.2d at 260. The People argtqed that this scheme, although targeting a
single victim, occurred over a sixteen-month period and defendant received
separate interest payments at usury rates of 260% annually. Id. at 13, 603
N.Y.S.2d at 258. The court looked at the intent of the legislature underlying
the criminal usury statute and the nature of the crime, and determined that
criminal usury fell into a hybrid of crimes which have an element that
sometimes can be committed by a single act or omission, or by several
different acts or omissions over a period of time. Id. at 18-19, 603 N.Y.S.2d
at 262.
108. Hempstead Video, Inc., N.Y. L.J., Dec. 29, 1994, at 27.
788 [Vol 11
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caused by a single or separate impulse; whether there was a
single purpose or objective in the commission of the acts, and
whether the acts were for personal gain. 10 9
Citing Okafore, the court stated that ultimately, it must look at
the intent underlying the ordinance to determine whether its
purpose "was to prohibit a course of conduct or specific
described acts." 110 Guiding the court's reasoning was the
presumption against declaring an ordinance "continuous" and the
rule that "any factual conception of an offense as 'continuous' is
deemed to be easily rebuttable." 1 11
Applying these principles, the court explored the permit law's
purpose. First, it determined that the law was regulatory, as
opposed to revenue raising. 112 The court then noted that there
was no issue of separate intent or impulse in the alleged offenses
and that each separate act was deemed controlling.1 1 3 Finally, the
court looked at the way the law defines business, 114 finding that
it does not refer to "a continuous series of related acts, but occurs
every time a merchant opens his or her door to do business." 1 15
Thus, the court concluded that "business" is conducted every
time a business opens its door and, therefore, each day
Hempstead Video opened its door to do business, it committed a
separate offense. 116 This result was necessary, the court stated,
109. Id. (citing Brown, 159 Misc. 2d at 18-19, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 262).
110. Id. (citing Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d at 86, 527 N.E.2d at 248, 531
N.Y.S.2d at 765).
111. Id.
112. Id. The court determined the law to be mandatory and noted that the
law contemplated businesses applying, receiving, and displaying the required
permit prior to engaging in business. Id. Further, it found that the law served
the regulatory purpose of assuring the authorities of business compliance with
federal, state, and local codes (e.g., fire and building codes), as well as
protecting consumers by providing them with information concerning the
business. Id. The court stated that it was particularly appropriate for a
regulatory law to apply strict liability, which this ordinance did. Id.
113. Id. at 27.
114. The court deemed it important that the ordinance defined "business" as
an "entity through which mercantile activity is engaged in; that is, the thing
through which 'business' is done." Id.
115. Id. Cf. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1993).
116. Hempstead Video, Inc., N.Y. L.J., Dec. 29, 1994, at 27.
19951 789
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or else defendants would be free to flaunt the permit law after
paying the initial $100 fne.117
Hempstead Video's second constitutional claim was that it had
been the victim of unconstitutional discrimination in the form of
"selective prosecution." 118 Hempstead Video claimed that the
ordinances were being used for the sole purpose of denying it the
right to sell "adult novelties" offensive to various officials. 119
Therefore, Hempstead Video alleged, it had been denied equal
protection of the laws under the New York and Federal
Constitutions.
The court, citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins12 0 and People v.
Goodman,12 1 established that intentional discrimination in the
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. In support of its claim, Hempstead Video pointed to a 60-day
moratorium enacted at the time it applied for a permit, and also noted various
pronouncements made in local newspapers by public officials declaring the
moral dilemma of "adult" business. Id. Hempstead Video sought a hearing to
prove that the law was merely a revenue producing ordinance, that many
villagers operate without a permit, and that it had been subjected to a level of
enforcement uncommon to similarly situated villagers. Id. The People
countered that Hempstead Video had not adequately supported its allegations
and that the prosecutor's motives were pure. Id. Moreover, the People
contended that the law was being enforced to the extent possible. Id.
120. 118 U.S. 351 (1886). Long ago, in the much hailed Yick Wo decision,
petitioner was convicted for violating a local ordinance which prohibited the
operation of laundries that were not located in brick or stone buildings without
consent from a supervising board. Id. at 358. Yick Wo alleged that over 200
other Chinese nationals were denied consent by the supervising board, while
all but one non-Chinese was given consent. Id. at 359. Reversing Yick Wo's
conviction, the Court held that:
The facts shown establish an administration directed so exclusively
against a particular class of persons as to warrant and require the
conclusion, that, whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as
adopted, they are applied by the public authorities charged with their
administration, and thus representing the State itself, with a mind so
unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial... of equal
protection... [If] the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority
with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust
and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances
[then the law will deny equal protection].
[Vol 11
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administration of a facially valid law violates equal protection. 122
Drawing from this principle, further refined in 303 West 42nd St.
Corp. v. Kein,12 3 the court noted that a facially valid law
applied by public authorities, with an "evil eye and an unequal
Id. at 373-74 (emphasis added).
121. 31 N.Y.2d 262, 290 N.E.2d 139, 338 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1972). A village
ordinance prohibited commercial signs exceeding four square feet in area. Id.
at 264, 290 N.E.2d at 140, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 99. The defendant, a registered
pharmacist operating a drug store, maintained four signs that exceeded this
limit. Id. at 265, 290 N.E.2d at 141, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 100. The court found
that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the police power designed to
promote aesthetics, bearing on economic and cultural community
considerations. Id. at 267, 290 N.E.2d at 142, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 101. As to the
selective enforcement claim, the record was deemed to belie a showing of
unequal enforcement as three others were cited under the ordinance on the day
of defendant's conviction. Id. at 268, 290 N.E.2d at 143, 338 N.Y.S.2d at
103. Thus, defendant had not even shown an "unequal hand," much less the
"evil eye" derived from YIck Wo. Id.
122. Hempstead Video, Inc., N.Y. L., Dec. 29, 1994, at 27.
123. 46 N.Y.2d 686, 389 N.E.2d 815, 416 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1979). The
petitioner corporation leased a part of its building, located in the Times Square
area, for use as an adult bookstore and two adult theaters. Id. at 690, 389
N.E.2d at 817, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 221. The petitioners initial application for a
permit to reconstruct part of the building to accommodate the new tenant was
granted. Id. Later, however, a "clean up" Times Square campaign occurred
which declared intentions to drive out "adult" businesses and, simultaneously,
the Commissioner of Buildings took a new look at the reconstruction permit.
Id. After a hearing, the petitioner was ordered to install sprinklers throughout
the entire building. Id. at 691, 389 N.E.2d at 817, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 222. The
petitioner claimed the fire regulation was being enforced in a discriminatory
manner as a result of the clean up campaign. Id. at 691, 389 N.E.2d at 818,
416 N.Y.S.2d at 222. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower
courts' holdings that petitioner had not made a showing of arbitrary and
capricious discrimination. Id. at 698, 389 N.E.2d at 821, 416 N.Y.S.2d at
226. An evidentiary hearing was required, the court of appeals concluded,
since petitioner had demonstrated a reasonable probability of success on the
merits of the claim. Id. But the court pointed out that petitioner would have to
demonstrate both an "evil eye" and an "unequal hand." Id. at 693, 389
N.E.2d at 818, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 223. In other words, the court stated that it
would be required for petitioner to show that the law was not applied equally
to others and that selective enforcement vras based on "an impermissible
standard such as race, religion or some other arbitrary classification." Id.
1995]
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hand," violates equal protection. 124 Not only would Hempstead
Video have to show the law was applied unequally to others
similarly situated, but also that the unequal enforcement was
carried out with an "evil eye," or that enforcement "was based
upon a constitutionally impermissible standard or arbitrary
classification. ' 125 Also, the Hempstead Video, Inc. court stressed
that a showing of lax enforcement to others similarly situated is
not enough 126 and that officials may consider such factors as
police resources, available manpower, the nature of the violation,
and effective deterrence.127
Applying these principles, the court flatly rejected Hempstead
Video's selective prosecution claim. First, there was not a
sufficient showing of unequal enforcement. 128 For instance,
Hempstead Video's assertion that the law was not vigorously
enforced was insufficient as well as inconsistent with the
record. 129 Moreover, Hempstead Video did not establish that
124. Hempstead Video, Inc., N.Y. L.L, Dec. 29, 1994, at 27.
125. Id.
126. See People v. Friedman, 302 N.Y. 75, 81, 96 N.E.2d 184, 186 (1950)
(finding that the proof was not sufficient to establish a pattern of consciously
practiced discrimination where "it merely indicated some nonenforcement (sic]
as to certain other businesses many of which were allowed to remain open").
127. Various policy justifications behind the dual requirement of showing
the "evil eye" and "unequal hand," referred to in Klein, include the fact that
effective use of limited police resources often requires uneven enforcement.
For example, sometimes prosecutors legitimately pursue a case more
vehemently as it has the right fact pattern to challenge an unfavorable
ordinance. Klein, 46 N.Y.2d at 694, 389 N.E.2d at 819, 416 N.Y.S.2d at
224. The deterrence rational has gone far in upholding uneven prosecutions
where the purpose was to select serious violators, or prosecute in high
violation areas. Id. Also, there is a reluctance to give broad leeway in
adjudicating selective enforcement claims, the Klein court noted, because every
time someone felt singled out they would request a hearing. Id. at 695, 389
N.E.2d at 819, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 224.
128. Hempstead Video, Inc., N.Y. L.J., Dec. 29, 1994, at 28.
129. Id. The court found that uniform enforcement was apparent where six
prosecutions were conducted in a period of three years during which at least
135 permits were issued. Id. Even if it was true that no business had been
subjected to the level of enforcement Hempstead Video had, the court stated,
no business had flaunted the law as much. Id. Cf. Goodman, 31 N.Y.2d at
268, 290 N.E.2d at 142, 338 N.Y.S.2d at 103 (noting the record was deemed
792 [Vol I11
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enforcement was based on an impermissible standard. For
instance, the purpose behind prosecution of Hempstead Video
could have been deterrence, most particularly where this was a
highly publicized case. 130
Hempstead Video's third constitutional claim was that the
permit law facially violated its freedom of expression under the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I,
section eight of the New York Constitution as it gave officials
impermissible discretion to deny a permit based solely on the
content of what an applicant intends to sell. 131 Ruling on this
contention, the court laid out appropriate regulations of
"commercial speech" derived from Young v. American Mini-
Theaters, Inc.132 After Young, reasonable, content-neutral, time,
to belie a selective enforcement claim where three others were cited under the
same ordinance on the day of defendant's conviction).
130. Id.
131. Id. Hempstead Video also argued that the law was being enforced
unconstitutionally as officials were using it to ban Hempstead Video
specifically, and "adult" businesses generally. Id. In support of this claim,
Hempstead Video pointed to public pronouncements surrounding the 60-day
moratorium on adult businesses enacted at the time Hempstead Video opened.
Id. Rejecting this claim, the court noted that the moratorium was intended to
give officials time to consider a new zoning law restricting "adult" businesses
to certain areas. Id. The court found that "the moratorium constituted a
reasonable stop-gap... measure designed to temporarily halt development
while comprehensive changes were duly considered." Id. Cf. 119 Dev.
Assocs. v. Village of Irvington, 171 A.D.2d 656, 657, 566 N.Y.S.2d 954,
955 (2d Dep't 1991). Plaintiff's "takings clause" action, brought after a
temporary building moratorium, was found to be without merit on the ground
that the enactment constituted a legitimate exercise of the police power to
temporarily halt development while zoning measures were considered. Id.
132. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). The respondents operated "adult" movie theaters.
Id. at 55. They brought an action against Detroit officials challenging a zoning
ordinance amending an "Anti-Skid Row Ordinance" adopted ten years earlier.
Id. The challenged ordinances prohibited adult theaters from operating within
1000 feet of two "regulated uses" and within 500 feet of a residential area. Id.
at 52. Rejecting respondent's claim that the ordinance was an invalid prior
restraint on free expression, the Court held that reasonable licensing and
zoning laws are constitutional. Id. at 60. The Court noted that commercial
exhibition of "material that is on the borderline between pornography and
artistic impression deserves less protection than free dissemination of ideas of
social and political significance ...." Id. at 61. The Court reasoned that
7931995]
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place, and manner restrictions were upheld in City of Renton v.
Playtime Theaters, Inc.133 and Town of Islip v. Caviglia.134 In
light of the principles enunciated in theses cases, the court
rejected Hempstead Video's claim that the ordinance facially
violated freedom of expression. 135 The court concluded that
"[t]he mere fact that the commercial exploitation of materials
protected by the First Amendment is subject to zoning and other
licensing requirements is not a sufficient reason for invalidating
these ordinances." 13 6
The Hempstead Video, Inc., court merged state and federal law
in adjudicating the double jeopardy claim, however, New York
has provided greater protection from successive prosecutions
under New York's Criminal Procedure Law section 40.20.137
subjecting places where films are exhibited to regulation, does not infringe free
expression in light of the countervailing interest of the city in commercial
regulation. Id. at 63.
133. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). Respondents purchased two theaters intending to
exhibit "adult" films and challenged a city ordinance prohibiting "adult"
theaters from operating within 1000 feet of any residential zone, single or
multiple dwelling, church, park or school. Id. at 45. The Court held that
because the ordinance did not ban such theaters absolutely, it could properly be
deemed a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction. Id. at 46. Such
regulations were noted reasonable so long as they served a substantial
government interest and do not limit alternative avenues to communication. Id.
at 47. The Court reasoned that the city had a substantial interest in concerning
itself with the effects of "adult" businesses and there were alternative avenues
of communication as the ordinance was not an absolute ban. Id. at 49. The
Court noted that preserving quality of life from urban decline is a substantial
government interest. Id. at 54.
134. 73 N.Y.2d 544, 540 N.E.2d 215, 542 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1989). The
petitioner, Town of Islip, sought to enjoin an "adult" bookstore owner from
operating in a zone prohibited by ordinance. Id. at 548, 540 N.E.2d at 216,
542 N.Y.S.2d at 140. The ordinance provided that non-conforming "adult"
uses shall be amortized over a period of years based on a graduated scale of
investment in the business. Id. The court held that the ordinance was a
reasonable, content-neutral, time, place, and manner restriction in light of the
fact that petitioner had failed to show a loss sufficient to outweigh the
government interest. Id. at 561, 540 N.E.2d at 224, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
135. Hempstead Video, Inc., N.Y. L.J., Dec. 29, 1994, at 28.
136. Id. (citation omitted).
137. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 40.20. For example, under federal
constitutional doctrine, each state and the federal government are viewed as
794 [Vol 11
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Under the Federal Constitution, only separate prosecutions which
arise out of the "same offense" are deemed double jeopardy. 138
New York goes further than the Federal Constitution by defining
"previous prosecutions" barred as double jeopardy as including
prosecutions occurring in a separate sovereign. 139
Although the New York Legislature has broadened the federal
criteria for determining double jeopardy, it enumerated six
exemptions to successive prosecutions which receive no
protection. 140 In Hempstead Video, Inc., the court focused on
Criminal Procedure Law section 40.20(2)(a), 141 noting that
double jeopardy does not bar successive prosecutions where
either the elements of the charge are substantially different or the
acts constituting the offense are distinguishable in terms of
time. 142 Having stated this, the Hempstead Video court, citing
Blockburger, noted that determination of whether two offenses
are the same is based upon whether either offense requires proof
of a fact which the other does not. 143 Thus, while New York
purports to provide greater protection from successive
prosecution under Criminal Procedure Law section 40.20, the
rationale of Hempstead Video, Inc. makes the point that
separate sovereigns and, therefbre, each sovereign may prosecute a crime
against its own laws regardless of whether there has been a previous
prosecution in another sovereign; see also Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88
(1985). In Health, the Court held that "[tihe dual sovereignty
doctrine... compels the conclusion that successive prosecutions by two States
for the same conduct are not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause."
However, under New York's Criminal Procedure Laws, a "previous
prosecution" barred as double jeopardy includes previous prosecutions by
another state or by the federal government. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 40.30(1) (McKinney 1992).
138. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. See, e.g., Blockburger, 28f U.S. at 304.
Devising the "same offense" test, the Court concluded the ultimate
determination rests on "whether each provision requires proof of an additional
fact which the other does not." Id.
139. See N.Y. CIUM. PROC. LAW § 40.30(1) (McKinney 1992).
140. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 40.20(2)(a)-(f) (McKinney 1992).
141. See N.Y. CraM. PROC. LAW § 40.20(a).
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applications of state and federal constitutional doctrine to
"continuous offense" claims are, in fact, substantially identical.
The applicable test governing claims of selective enforcement
under both the New York and Federal Constitutions are the same.
Both New York and federal law require a showing of unequal
enforcement with an impermissible purpose. Thus, the New York
Constitution is no aid to a defendant who must bear the heavy
burden of establishing that the law was applied with the "unequal
hand" and "evil eye" faced by the petitioner in Yick Wo.
The applicable test governing content-neutral time, place, and
manner restrictions of "commercial speech" is the same under
both the New York and Federal Constitutions. 144 Playtime
Theaters and Caviglia hold that such regulations are permissible
if four factors are satisfied. First, the "predominant purpose" of
the ordinance is not to regulate the content of the material
purveyed but to control the "secondary effects" of such uses on
the community. 145 Second, the ordinance has to serve a
substantial government interest. 146 Third, the ordinance must be
narrowly tailored to limit only the unwanted effects. Finally,
there must be alternative avenues of communication. 147 In
Hempstead Video, Inc., the "predominate purpose" of the
ordinance was deemed to be controlling the "secondary effects"
of "adult" businesses on the quality of community life which was
noted to serve a substantial government interest.148 The
ordinance was also narrow enough to survive Hempstead Video's
constitutional challenge. Lastly, there were adequate alternative
144. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41, 45 (1986). See
Town of Islip v. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d 544, 552, 540 N.E.2d 215, 218, 542
N.Y.S.2d 139, 142.
145. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. at 54 (finding the "predominant purpose"
was to control the "secondary effects" of urban decline linked to "adult"
business); Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 552, 540 N.E.2d at 218, 542 N.Y.S.2d at
148.
146. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. at 54 (stating preservation of quality of
life and preventing urban decline serves as substantial government interest);
Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 551, 540 N.E.2d at 218, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
147. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. at 49 (finding alternative avenues of
communication exist as ordinance is not an absolute ban).
148. Hempstead Video, Inc., N.Y. L.J., Dec. 29, 1994, at 28.
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avenues of communication as the ordinance did not purport to be
an absolute ban. 149
It should be noted, however, that New York has traditionally
held an expansive view of freedom of expression under its own
constitution. As the Caviglia court recognized:
[F]reedom of expression in books, movies and the arts,
generally, is one of those areas in which the Supreme Court has
displayed great reluctant to expand Federal constitutional
protections, holding instead that the subject is governed
essentially by community standards 150 and, as we have said
before, New York has a long history and tradition of fostering
freedom of expression, often tolerating and supporting works
which in other states would be found offensive to the
community. 151
However, as Hempstead Video, Inc. makes clear, a content-
neutral, time, place, and manner restriction will be upheld in
New York if it is reasonable in scope and bears a rational and
relevant relation to a substantial government interest in
compliance with the minimum protections provided under federal
constitutional doctrine. 152
149. Id.
150. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973). Stressing that
obscenity should be governed by contemporary community values, the Court
stated: "people in different states vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this
diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity." Id.
151. Caviglia, 73 N.Y.2d at 556, 540 N.E.2d at 221, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 145
(citations omitted). See, e.g., People v. P.1. Video. Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 309,
501 N.E.2d 556, 564, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 915 (1986) (making the point that
New York courts should find community standards, under the Miller obscenity
test, with deference to the state's traditional liberalism toward freedom of
expression and with regard to the state's leadership role in promoting related
values).
152. Hempstead Video, Inc.. N.Y. L.J., Dec. 29, 1994 at 28.
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